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At the first meeting of the Institute in April, 1962, a 
very comprehensive and instructive talk on "Express and Implied 
Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases in Arkansas” was made by one of 
our members, J. A. O'Connor, Jr. of El Dorado. At the coming 
meeting of the Arkansas Bar in June, the Mineral Section will hear 
Professor Maurice Merrill of the University of Oklahoma Law School, 
the author of the standard treatise on implied covenants, speak on 
the subject of recent Arkansas decisions in the field. With such 
recent and imminent coverage, one may wonder what is left for me 
to discuss— and, frankly, that question has haunted me.
I would like to divide the discussion today into two sections. 
First, a discussion of necessary parties, and, secondly, the 
question of burden of proof as it has been discussed in lease 
cancellation cases.
I.
Since the question of "Parties” is essentially statutory,
note should be taken at the outset of certain applicable sections
of the Arkansas Statutes. Section 28-801 (Ark. Stats. 1947, Anno.
being Section 25 of the Civil Code) provides that "Every action
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest" with
certain exceptions not applicable to this type of litigation.
Section 27-806 provides generally for the joinder of parties
plaintiff and defendant, and Section 27-814 provides:
"The court may determine any controversy between parties 
before it, when it can be done without prejudice to the 
rights of others, or by saving their rights. But when a 
determination of the controversy between the parties 
before the court can not be made without the presence of 
other parties, the court must order them to be brought 
in."
In an early decision, Smith v. Moore, 49 Ark. 100, 4 S.W. 2d
282 (1886), the court said:
"The obvious intention of the statute is to require all 
persons to be made parties to an action who will be 
necessarily and materially affected by its result...."
With this statutory background, which is not essentially 
different from similar procedural laws of most jurisdictions, we 
turn to an examination of some of the problems which arise with 
respect to parties in lease cancellation cases. Before doing 
that, however, let me point out that in this discussion I am not 
attempting to define and distinguish between the terms "proper", 
"necessary" and "indispensable" parties as those terms are used in 
federal procedure and in some state procedural laws. This could be 
the subject of a whole Institute and then probably not be exhausted. 
When I speak of "parties", I am trying to use that term in the 
sense of "necessary" parties as mentioned in the section of the 
Civil Code of Arkansas quoted above and as defined by the Arkansas 
Supreme Court in construing that section.
In Alphin et al. v. Gulf Refining Co., 39 F. Supp. 570 (W.D.
Ark. 1941), suit was brought to cancel a lease which originally 
covered 440 acres of land. After the lease was executed, the 
lessor conveyed 200 acres in fee to the plaintiffs, who also be- 
came owners of substantial interests in the minerals. Defendants 
were Gulf Refining Co., a partial assignee of the lease as to this 
200 acres and the remaining owners of the oil, gas and mineral rights 
in the 200 acres. However, one of the named defendants had died 
prior to the filing of the suit and his heirs and devisees were not 
made parties. Apparently, they were the owners of an undivided 
1/16 interest in the oil, gas and minerals in one 10-acre tract.
Gulf contended that the implied covenants of the lease were 
indivisible and that the action "could only be instituted where 
there has been an election so to do by all of the owners of the 
reversion and where all of the owners of such reversion have joined 
in demand for performance."
Relying upon Standard Oil Company of Louisiana v. Giller, 183 
Ark. 776, 38 S.W. 2d 766 (1931), Judge Miller held that in Arkansas
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the implied covenants are divisible, that is, "The covenants to 
develop extend to the entire tract, and the development of a 
portion of the lease by either the original lessee or his 
assignee does not relieve the holders of the remainder of the 
lease from proceeding with the development of the tract as an 
entirety in the manner contemplated by the covenants of the lease,"
While one may argue as to the exact meaning of the language just 
quoted, (see the very interesting statements made by Mr, O'Connor 
in footnotes 7 and 37 of the paper presented at last year's meeting 
and mentioned at the outset) I think it is safe to say that Judge 
Miller's holding would be accepted now without question in the 
courts of this State, He buttressed his opinion by specifically 
referring to and relying upon the leading case of Thiessen v, Weber 
et al., 128 Kan, 556, 278 P, 770 (1929), which had a very similar 
factual situation in that some of the mineral owners refused to join 
with the plaintiff in the suit. Aside from the technical questions 
of divisibility or indivisibility of the covenants, the possibility 
of one tenant in common being blocked by some of his co-tenants, 
whose connections with the lessee may be of some moment, certainly 
appeals to the traditional conscience of courts of equity; and, 
possibly more important, the traditional American concern for the plight 
of the underdog.
While I have said that Judge Miller's decision would probably 
be accepted without question in the courts of this State, one 
possible exception should be mentioned and that is with respect 
to the heirs of the owners of the undivided 1/16 mineral interest 
in 10 acres who were not parties. While the opinion does not 
expressly except the rights of the absent heirs, presumably that 
was covered in the decree since, clearly, the court would have had 
no jurisdiction to cancel the lease as to that interest* As a 
practical matter, Gulf probably had no further interest in the 200 
acres and made no issue of it, but surely no conclusion should be 
drawn from the failure of the opinion to deal specifically with 
the rights of these absent owners.
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So much for the question of joinder of owners of "partici-
pating" interests in the oil, gas and minerals or, as is some-
times said, owners of the "reversionary" interests. We now 
consider the question of the joinder of parties who do not own 
an interest in the reversion nor a right to participate in the 
making of a new lease but who do own an interest in the production 
under the lease sought to be cancelled. Let us begin with the easy 
case and work to the hard case in the accepted pedagogical manner.
Is the owner of an overriding royalty interest a necessary 
party to an action to cancel the lease? Almost without looking at 
a book we would say so. In the language of the Arkansas Supreme 
Court, the overriding royalty owner's interest "will be materially 
affected by its results" and the determination of the controversy 
can hardly be done "without prejudice to those not before the 
court". While there are no cases in Arkansas dealing directly 
with the interest of the overriding royalty owner, the Federal case 
from Texas, Keegan v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. et al., 155 F. 2d 
971 (5th Cir. 1946) is a leading case on the subject, and after some 
discussion of the rights of absent royalty owners and owners of 
reversionary rights, etc., the court cones down to decide the case 
solely upon the point that the owner of an overriding royalty 
interest was a necessary party, saying:
"We prefer, however, to rest our decision on the absence 
of the owners of the overriding royalty interest. This 
is an interest carved out of the lessee's share of the 
oil as distinguished from the owner's share. Wright v.
Brush, 115 F. 2d 265 (10th Cir.). Their interests are 
so bound up with Humble Oil & Refining Company that the 
relief prayed for in the bill divesting Humble of its 
leasehold would deprive them of their right to share in 
the oil produced. These parties have no reversionary 
interest separable from their right to receive a portion 
of the oil produced. A decree depriving them of such 
interest without being heard could not be legally made, 
since no court can make a direct adjudication on rights 
of the parties not before it. Gregory v. Stetson, 133 
U.S. 579, 10 S.C. 422, 33 L. Ed. 792.
"The absent defendants, Berry and others similarly 
situated are indispensable parties."
It should be clear, therefore, that owners of overriding 
royalty, oil payments and other interests carved out of the lessee's 
estate are, and should be, necessary parties to the litigation
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since they will be directly and materially affected by any 
action respecting the validity of the lease.
A somewhat harder case is made with respect to the owners 
of "term" royalty. The Supreme Court of Texas has recently had 
occasion to pass on this question in Royal Petroleum Corporation
et al. v. Dennis et al., ___Tex. ___, 332 S.W. 2d 313, 12 O&GR 578
(1960). Plaintiffs executed an oil and gas lease in 1928 for a 
primary term of ten years and as long thereafter as production 
continued from the leased premises. Subsequent to the making of 
the lease, the lessors conveyed two royalty interests "conditioned 
that if there were no paying production on the land on September 
24, 1950, and for six months thereafter, the conveyances should 
become null and void, otherwise they should remain in full force 
and effect as long as production continued," Other conveyances 
of perpetual mineral interests and fee interests were made. The 
court said that "the sole question presented is whether or not 
certain term royalty owners, as well as others who owned mineral 
interests in the land, are necessary parties to a suit brought by 
the lessor of an oil and gas lease in trespass to try title against 
the lessee." The suit was brought to have adjudicated the fact 
issue of whether the lease had terminated from cessation of pro- 
duction in paying quantities rather than to cancel on the basis of 
the implied covenants. In reversing the Court of Appeals and 
holding that the term royalty owners were necessary parties, the 
court said:
"The primary term of the lease extended to June 4, 1938, 
while the unconditional term of the royalty grants ex-
tended until six months after September 24, 1950. The 
record does not disclose when it is claimed that pro-
duction ceased so as to terminate the lease, but that 
would seem to be immaterial so far as the result of 
this suit in its effect upon the outstanding royalty 
interest is concerned. If it were found as a fact in 
this cause that production had ceased and the lease, 
therefore, had terminated, theoretically that judgment 
would not be binding upon the royalty owners who were 
not made parties. But their rights would be determined 
for all practical purposes. Even theoretically the term 
of these royalties would end, for that judgment would 
oust the petitioners, entitle the respondents to pos-
session of the premises and production would then quite 
likely cease without dispute. At least the matter would 
be entirely within the control of respondents."
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The court held, however, that the owners of the mineral 
interests in fee were not necessary parties and that the plaintiffs 
had their right to maintain a suit without joinder of their co- 
tenants, citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, 80 Tex, 101, 15 S.W, 705;
Carley v. Parton, 75 Tex. 98, 12 S.W. 950 (cf. Alphin v. Gulf 
Refining Co., supra)•
Having seen that owners of overriding royalty interests are 
indispensable parties to a suit to cancel a lease, and rightfully 
so, it seems, and, further, that the owner of a term royalty 
interest is a necessary party where he would be affected by a 
decision as to cessation of production, consider now the hard 
question: Is the owner of a perpetual, non-participating royalty
interest a necessary party to a suit to cancel an oil and gas 
lease? The rationale of the rule applied in the case of overriding 
royalty and term royalty is that those owners are necessary parties 
because their title is or will be directly affected by the court's 
holding. In the case of the overriding royalty owner, his interest 
will be completely extinguished if the lease is cancelled, and, in 
the case of the term royalty owner, the crucial question of whether 
his interest is maintained in force by production may likewise be 
settled, possibly not as directly, but in a practical aspect as 
real.
The owner of the perpetual royalty interest, however, owns his 
interest regardless of the existence or non-existence of an oil and 
gas lease. He is entitled to his proportionate part of the oil and 
gas produced, free of cost, if, as and when production is obtained 
and regardless of what lease is then in force. Furthermore, by 
express provision of his deed, he has no part in the making of the 
new lease. It would seem, therefore, that the non-participating 
royalty owner whose interest is fixed and perpetual would not be a 
necessary party in a suit to cancel an oil and gas lease-but this 
is not the law, at least not in Arkansas.
In Hunt v. McWilliams, 218 Ark. 922, 240 S.W. 2d 865 (1950), a 
majority of the court held that the owners of perpetual, non- 
participating royalty, whose deed expressly provided that they 
would have no part in the making of any oil and gas lease, were
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nevertheless necessary parties to a suit to cancel a portion of the 
lease for breach of the implied covenant to develop. The court 
relied, primarily, upon Calcote v. Texas Pacific Coal and Oil
Company, 157 F. 2d 216 (5th Cir. 1946) and seems to sum up its
holding in the following language:
"Unfortunately cancellation of itself affected the 
holders of these interests, for the decree cleared 
the way for the landowner to contract anew. This 
later lease may or it may not be advantageous to the 
old royalty grantees; but the fact remains that the 
rights to oil and gas taken from property under a 
lease existing when the royalties were conveyed were 
destroyed as to that lease, and this was done while 
they were legally absent. This does not mean that, as 
to non-participating royalty owners, they would have to 
be consulted in circumstances where a new lease could 
be legally negotiated."
The dissenting opinion filed by Justice McFadden, in which 
Justice Milwee concurred, emphasized these provisions of the 
royalty deed: (1) That the exclusive leasing privileges remained 
in the grantor; (2) that the grantor would never execute an oil 
and gas lease which reserved less than 1/8 of all of the oil and 
gas produced and saved from the land; and (3) that the grantee 
should receive his proportionate fraction of the royalty reserved 
under any present or future lease and, in any event, should be 
entitled to receive his royalty portion times 1/8 of the gross 
production. Judge McFadden summarizes his dissent in the following 
language:
"I submit that if the holder of a non-participating 
royalty deed is a necessary party to a suit to cancel 
a pre-existing lease— as the majority holds— then the 
same reasoning carried to its logical conclusion would 
mean that the holder of a non-participating royalty deed 
is an essential party to sign a new oil and gas lease on 
the premises. I don’t believe the majority of the court 
will ever go that far. It would certainly be revolutionary 
in the oil business for a person holding such an instru-
ment as the one here copied to have to be consulted about 
the execution of a lease, when the very instrument under 
which he claims, says that he has no right to be con-
sulted."
At the close of the majority opinion, Chief Justice Griffin
Smith made this significant statement, which may have been the real
point on which the decision turned for the majority:
"It is conceivable (though not suggested in this case) 
that collusive action between lessor and lessee could 
so adversely affect royalty grantees as to destroy or 
impair their property rights."
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The type of royalty deed quoted in Hunt is discussed in a
Comment in 3 Ark, L. Rev. 190. It will be noted that under the 
terms of the deed in question the owner of the leasing rights 
covenants not to make a lease reserving less than 1/8 royalty, 
provides that the grantee shall be entitled to a fraction of the 
royalty so reserved and shall in any event be entitled to his 
proportionate part of 1/8 of the gross production. Suppose that 
the lessor reserved a royalty of 1/4 rather than 1/8. Logically, 
the royalty owner would be entitled to receive his proportionate 
part of the royalty, be it 1/8 or 1/4. Jones, Non Participating 
Royalty, 1948, 26 Tex. L. Rev. 569. If the lease sought to be 
cancelled provided for a 1/4 royalty rather than 1/8, the non- 
participating royalty owner should be vitally affected by a 
cancellation of that lease and the subsequent making of a lease 
by the lessor which provided for only the regular 1/8 royalty. It 
could be that the majority in Hunt had this sort of situation in 
mind although the language does not indicate that their thinking 
had been refined to this point. In such a case, it would seem 
that a royalty owner would be a necessary party. Therefore, while 
we may still disagree with Hunt on the facts of that case, it is 
equally erroneous to lay down a general rule that non-participating 
royalty owners, even though their ownership be perpetual, should not 
in particular cases be necessary parties.
It follows, therefore, that under present Arkansas law, 
prudence will require that royalty owners be made parties as a 
precautionary measure. And, of course, there is little likelihood 
of the question reaching the appellate court since the careful 
attorney will always make them parties rather than jeopardize his 
client's case on the merits.
II.
There are few situations, from my experience, that leave the 
practitioner in such a desperate sense of helplessness and 
frustration as trying to give a client a definitive estimate of 
his rights and prospects in a lease cancellation case. But this 
is not entirely the fault of the decisions. It is inherent in the
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application of broad equitable principles to the myriad factual 
situations. I have heard it said that the confusion that 
results from the application of the implied covenants is 
due to the fact that they are creatures of the courts. On 
the other hand, dissatisfaction with the courts* writing of the 
covenant has not led the draftsmen of oil and gas leases to 
attempt to write such a covenant in their own language. Until 
someone in the industry is willing to undertake that task, the 
inference must be drawn that what we have from the courts, with 
all its imperfections, is as good as the parties— and primarily 
the lessee— can devise.
In the early Arkansas cases dealing with long term leases 
(in some cases, 50 years) where no bonus was paid and the only 
consideration to the lessor was the royalty reserved, the court 
seemed to impose upon the lessee an "absolute duty" to proceed 
with the development of the premises within a reasonable time 
without regard to profitability of production or other consider- 
ations, Mansfield v . Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 133 S.W. 837 (1911), 
Millar v. Mauney, 150 Ark. 161, 234 S.W. 498 (1921). However, in 
most of these cases there had been no development whatever on the 
leased premises for a substantial period of time, in some cases,
10 years or more; and under the terms of the lease, the lessee was 
not required to do anything for a period of 25 to 50 years. In those 
circumstances, the court was certainly justified in the rules that 
it then announced and its application of those rules.
However, in the 20*s and early 30*s, the lease with a primary 
term of ten years or less, as we know it today, began to reach the 
courts. In the early cases, the court said the burden was on the 
plaintiff to prove that the lessee had failed to act "in good 
faith" for the mutual interest of both lessor and lessee. In 
later cases, and at about the time of the adoption of the conser-
vation laws of this State, the court began to talk of the burden 
of proof being upon the plaintiff to show that the lessee had not 
acted as a "reasonably prudent operator".
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In Ezzell v. Oil Associates, Inc., 180 Ark. 802, 22 S.W. 2d
1015 (1930), following a review of the earlier cases involving 
the long term leases mentioned above, this transition is evident 
in the following language:
"Because of the absence of an express provision as to 
the number of wells to be drilled, it does not follow 
that this matter is subject alone to the will of the 
lessee. There is in every lease for the production of 
oil and gas, where the principal consideration is the 
payment of royalties, a condition, implied when not 
expressed, that, when the existence of either oil or 
gas in paying quantities is found from drilling wells 
on the leased premises, the lessee should drill such 
number of wells as in the exercise of sound judgment 
he may deem reasonably necessary to secure oil or gas 
for the mutual advantage of the lessor and the lessee."
In Wood v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Company et al., 40 F. Supp 42
(W.D. Ark. 1941), the reasonably prudent operator rule received its
clearest statement. In denying cancellation, Judge Miller said:
"The production of oil from these and other leases is 
gradually diminishing, but in the absence of proof of 
facts which would justify a reasonably prudent operator 
to make additional tests, the defendants are entitled 
to retain possession of the leases.
"If, in the opinion of the plaintiff, the wells are not 
producing oil in paying quantities, and if he is able 
to produce testimony to show that a reasonably prudent 
operator would be justified in making the expenditure 
of money necessary for a deep test, he may make demand 
on the defendants to do so, and in the event of the 
failure of the defendants to take such action, then the 
plaintiff will be at liberty to take such action as may 
be necessary to protect his interest."
In Smith v. Moody, 192 Ark. 704, 94 S.W. 2d 357 (1936), a 
statement was made which was to plague the lessee unremittingly 
and sounded the death knell of the reasonably prudent operator 
test in Arkansas, or at least restricted its application to the 
very limited field which will be hereafter mentioned. In the 
Smith case the original lease covered 360 acres. Various portions 
had been acquired by different assignees, but nearly 11 years had 
elapsed between the drilling of the last well and institution of 
the suit. The court said:
"This delay would ordinarily support the finding that 
there had been a breach of the implied covenant to 
develop, if there were no facts to excuse the delay...."
The only discussion of an excuse is made and disposed of by
the court in the following language:
"Much testimony was offered as to the necessity of 
drilling other wells, the contention being that the 
wells now producing were at the edge of the producing 
fields, and that new wells could not be drilled and
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operated except at great loss. This contention may be 
disposed of by saying that, if true, the lessees have 
not been damaged by the cancellation of so much of the 
contract of lease as cannot be profitably performed."
One writer has very accurately described the impossible
position in which this language places the defendant-lessee in
the following:
"Taken literally, the last expression of the court 
presents the defendant-lessee with a first-class 
dilemma after the lessor has established that an 
unreasonable delay has occurred. The lessee must 
then go forward with evidence to show that a 
reasonably prudent operator would not drill additional 
wells. If he makes his proof sufficiently convincing 
to condemn the land for productive purposes, or to 
reveal that he has no intention of further develop-
ment, the court may conclude that he suffers no harm 
from a partial cancellation." (Kuntz, The Prudent 
Operator and Further Development, 9 Okl. L. Rev.,
Page 255-------------------------
The extent to which this language has carried the courts, and 
the effect it has had upon the reasonably prudent operator rule, 
is clearly demonstrated in the recent Arkansas case of Nolan v .
Thomas, 228 Ark. 572, 309 S.W. 2d 727 (1957). The lease in that 
case covered 160 acres, was made in 1944 and provided for a 
primary term of 10 years. Delay rentals had been seasonably paid 
throughout the primary term and in the last year of the lease the 
lessees assigned the lease as to certain formations to the defendants. 
The defendants drilled a well which was completed within the primary 
term and had been a small producer of oil at all times since. From 
the latter part of 1954 until May of 1956, some five or six letters 
were written requesting further development. The gist of the 
answers by the defendants was that the economics of the present 
well would not justify drilling an additional well, that a great 
deal of additional study would have to be given to drilling any 
further shallow wells because of the unfavorable results to date, 
and "regardless of what some other people might have thought of 
drilling some of the shallow wells, competent people have been 
consulting with us and have decided that this would not be a 
profitable undertaking for anyone...."
No evidence was offered by the plaintiffs as to whether 
additional drilling would be profitable or whether a reasonably
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prudent operator would drill additional wells, the evidence 
consisting solely in the lapse of time (less than two years), 
the evidence of the well being drilled and its production history, 
and the letters which were written between November, 1954, and the 
filing of the suit in May, 1956. The defendants demurred to the 
evidence and, upon the demurrer being overruled, declined to 
plead further and the plaintiffs were granted the relief sought.
In affirming, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs made a 
prima facie case "requiring the defendants to go forward and offer 
their proof upon the prudent operator matter when the plaintiffs 
showed these facts: (1) That the leases were made in 1944 and 
"allowed delay rentals to be paid each year for 10 years";
(2) that delay rentals were paid and no drilling was undertaken 
until the last year of the lease when the well was drilled and 
was a small producer; (3) that the plaintiffs insisted for more 
than two years that the defendants should drill other wells;
(4) the defendants consistently refused to drill such wells; and
(5) that the plaintiffs were not asking that the lease be cancelled 
on the forty acres on which the producing well was located.
Obviously, reasons 1, 2 and 5 have no application. The lessee 
should not be charged with delay during the primary term when 
rentals are paid for that delay. The fact that the drilling was 
undertaken in the last year of the primary term should not make 
any more difference, where delay rentals have been properly paid, 
than if the drilling had been commenced in the first year of the 
primary term. That partial cancellation only was asked has no 
bearing upon the breach of the implied covenant as to the remaining 
acreage.
So the two reasons which the court gives and which are pertinent 
are (1) that the plaintiffs insisted for more than two years that 
other wells be drilled and (2) that the defendants refused.
An excellent analysis of the holding in this case has been 
made by Professor Summers:
"The court did not require proof of breach of the
lessee's implied covenant to reasonably develop the
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premises under the reasonably prudent operator test.
It even held that the defendant had the burden of 
proving that a reasonably prudent operator would not 
have drilled additional wells. The theory upon which 
this case was decided is not readily apparent. The 
court may have thought it was adopting the Oklahoma 
doctrine stated in Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co.,
1943, 137 P. 2d 934, 192 Okl. 359, but under that doctrine 
the burden is not shifted to the lessee unless develop- 
ment of a portion of the lease premises has been delayed 
for an unreasonable period of time. Here the delay was 
not unreasonable, bueing less than three years. The court 
seems to infer that the lessee's delay in drilling the 
test well until near the end of the primary term was 
unjustifiable and that this delay, added to the two years 
elapsing after the drilling of the test well, amounted to 
an unreasonable time which relieved the lessor of the 
burden of proving a breach of the implied covenant to 
reasonably develop the lease. Such inference is entirely 
erroneous, since the lessee contracted for the option to 
delay drilling during the primary term of the payment of 
delay rental. The court quoted from Sauder v. Mid- 
Continent Petroleum Corp., 1934, 54 S. Ct. 671, 292 U.S.
272, 78 L . Ed. 1255, 93 A.L.R. 454, rehearing denied 54 
S. Ct. 856, 292 U. S. 613, 78 L. Ed. 1472, but that 
decision and the language quoted therefrom, did not support 
the court's decision, since there the delay in development 
was eight years." (3 Summers Oil and Gas, Section 465,
1962 Cumulative Pocket Parts)
The knock-out blow to the reasonably prudent operator was
delivered by Justice McFadden in the following language:
"The question is not only whether the plaintiffs in 
the case at bar had to show that a prudent operator 
would drill on the other three forty-acre tracts here 
involved; but the question is also whether the defendants 
should be allowed to prevail on a policy of refusing to 
drill and at the same time holding the lease on the un-
developed three forty-acre tracts, thereby preventing 
the plaintiffs from having the privilege of obtaining 
other persons who might drill on these three forty-acre 
tracts." (Italics supplied)
The court buttressed this act by quoting and italicizing the 
old statement from Smith v. Moody, supra, to the effect that if
the testimony of the lessees as to the unprofitably of further 
drilling is true they have not been damaged by cancellation of 
the lease as to such portion, which, according to their own 
testimony, cannot be profitably developed.
One further case needs to be mentioned, however, to illustrate 
the limited field in which the reasonably prudent operator test 
may remain pertinent. In Reynolds v. Smith, 231 Ark. 566, 331 S.W. 
2d 112 (1960), suit was brought to cancel a lease as to 120 acres 
of an original 200 acre lease. The lease was made in March, 1953, 
for a primary term of six months with a 30-day drilling clause for
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a 3500 foot well. The lessee had drilled seven wells upon the 
leased premises and contributed to the costs of drilling a dry 
hole on adjoining lands. Three of the wells were producing 
commercially at the time of the trial. In March, 1956, and 
thereafter up to December 3, 1957, lessors requested releases 
of the non-producing acreage. The lessors conceded that the 
entire 200 acres had been fully developed as to all known pro- 
ducing horizons in the area but contended that a deep test should 
be drilled. After quoting extensively from the Chancellor’s 
opinion, the court said:
"The primary and decisive question, therefore, is: Did 
the lessee here exercise that degree of prudence as an 
operator reasonably expected of him in the circumstances?
We hold that he had done so to date of trial.” Wood v.
Arkansas Fuel Oil Company, 40 F. Supp. 42 (1941).
At first glance, one would say that possibly some life had
been breathed into the reasonably prudent operator in this case
On close examination, however, it would appear that this is the
peculiar factual situation, as in the Wood case, of conceded
adequate development of known producing horizons but grounded
solely upon the plaintiff's demand for the drilling of a deeper
test. This is in the nature of "wildcatting” rather than developing
known producing formations. Apparently, in this rarefied factual
atmosphere the reasonably prudent operator still lives in Arkansas.
Therefore, on the basis of these recent decisions of the
Supreme Court, it would seem that Arkansas is now moving toward
accord with the law of Oklahoma in this field. In an excellent
treatment of the subject, Conn, Trends in the Application of the
Implied Covenant of Further Development, 12 Okl. L. Rev. 470, an
accurate analysis of what now appears to be the Arkansas law is
made:
"Proof of probable profitability or non-profitability 
of drilling additional wells is not relevant in an 
action to cancel the undeveloped portion of a lease-
hold by reason of alleged breach of the implied 
covenant of further development. If the lessor adduces 
a preponderance of the evidence that additional drilling 
would be profitable, then, on that issue, the court must 
enter a decree of cancellation or cancellation in the 
alternative. If the lessee adduces a preponderance of 
evidence additional drilling would probably be unprofitable, 
the same result follows, for the proof demonstrates that
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the lessee has no intention of drilling [Nolan v. Thomas, 
supra; Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 231 Ark. 357, 329 S.W.
2d 424 ( 1959)] or he desires to hold for speculative 
purposes or he seeks to keep that which is valueless,
"The lessee's delay, however, may be otherwise excusable. 
Thus, if the producing wells are adequately and efficiently 
draining all of the known producing horizons, [ Smart v. Crow, 
supra,] he has performed all that is required of him. Nor 
is there any obligation on the lessee to drill deeper 
formations in absence of showing that there is a possi- 
bility of production at the greater depth, [ Wood v. Arkansas 
Fuel Oil Company, supra; Reynolds v. Smith, supra]....
"If the lessee is engaged in activity consistent with the 
intention to drill the undeveloped acreage, the delay 
is excusable. Thus, if the lessee is waiting upon the 
results of geological studies being carried on at the 
time of trial, his delay is excusable. As to deeper 
formations, the lessee may stay future development until 
the results of nearby deep test are ascertained, [ Sparks v. ] 
Midstates Oil Corp., 148 F. Supp. 551, 554 (E.D. okl. 1957)  .]
"Further, if the lessee has entered into a farm-out agree-
ment or if he agrees he will perform additional drilling, 
the entry of an alternative decree, rather than outright 
cancellation, would appear appropriate." [cf. Skelly Oil Co. 
v. Scoggins, supra]
CONCLUSION
On the question of necessary parties, the lesson that needs to 
be emphasized is that rules of thumb using general categories is 
dangerous, e.g., that royalty owners should be necessary parties. In 
some instances, non-participating royalty owners should not be classed 
as necessary parties where their interest in production is fixed. On 
the other hand, there are cases where non-participating royalty 
owners will be very definitely affected by the terms of a new lease, 
and so are necessary parties.
As to the matter of proof in cancellation cases involving the 
implied covenant to develop, the "reasonably prudent operator" test 
no longer appears to be pertinent in Arkansas except in cases seeking 
deeper drilling or what would amount to "wildcatting". The trend 
of Arkansas cases is toward the principles developed in Oklahoma 
following the Doss Oil Royalty Co. case. The duty to further develop 
has not yet reached the absolute, but the gap has been substantially 
closed. The time may have come when the only relief for the lessee 
lies in the introduction of express covenants, within permissible 
limits.
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